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Recursion has been a central feature of syntactic theory in generative 
grammar since its establishment in the 1950s (Bar-Hillel, 1953; 
Chomsky, 1956; 1957). Yet, since the highly influential 2002 paper by 
Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch, and their strong hypothesis regarding the 
outstanding status of recursion in language, there has been a renewed 
interest in the subject. The ensuing debates, however, have been 
characterized by severe terminological confusion and thus been 
rendered futile at times. The aim of this article is to shed some light on 
different notions of recursion in general as well as in linguistic 
description and to provide a brief sketch of how these evolved in the 
development of generativism. We argue that two different 
perspectives need to be distinguished, which directly relate to distinct 
vantage points of earlier generative frameworks on the one hand and 
the Minimalist program on the other. 




Recursion nowadays is a highly topical issue within certain linguistic 
frameworks; a fact that may strike one as rather surprising given that it is by no 
                                           
*
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means a new concept. It has been applied in linguistic theory for a long time and 
descriptions of what would be known as recursive rules today can be traced as 
far back as to Pānini‘s grammar of Sanskrit (Kadvany, 2007). As regards 
modern linguistics, recursion was formalized syntactically as a mode of sentence 
generation in the wake of the establishment of generative grammar in the 1950s 
and credited with being the grammatical building block of, e.g., sentence 
embeddings as in Mary thinks that Paul believes that Kate is beautiful (Bar-
Hillel, 1953; Chomsky, 1957). In some form or the other, generativism 
thenceforth has understood it as the central combinatorial device of a finite 
repertoire of signs, accountable for the creativity in language: only if a grammar 
has ―recursive devices of some sort, it will produce infinitely many sentences‖ 
(Chomsky, 1957: 24). Furthermore, recursion is oftentimes not only understood 
as the heart of creativity but, building on that, also ascribed the potency to create 
sentences of arbitrary length, i.e., the alleged ―infinitude of language‖.1  
While recursion initially—i.e. in the 1950s and 1960s—was treated merely 
descriptively as a formal device exhibited by human language, it was later on 
gradually reframed from a biologistic perspective. In light of the innateness 
hypothesis it ―began to acquire [the] cognitive connotations [of] a genetically 
embedded computational procedure that is a central component of the human 
language faculty‖ (Tomalin, 2007: 1785).2 In the following decades, the notion 
of recursivity as a core component of a biologically based universal grammar 
(UG) and as a necessary (absolute) universal responsible for creativity in 
language was taken as a given within generativism (Pullum/Scholz, 2010; 
Newmeyer, 2008). 
                                           
1
  Claims on the infinitude of language are virtually ubiquitous in generative grammar—see 
e.g. Chomsky (1956; 1957, 1965); Hauser/Chomsky/Fitch (2002). For critiques of this very 
claim—on primarily mathematical grounds—see Pullum/Scholz (2010) and Sternefeld 
(2000). 
2
  See e.g. Chomsky (1965) for an example of this early development. 
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The recent revivification of the debate on the status of recursion
3
 can be 
pinned down to general trends of the Minimalist program (MP) and, more 
specifically, to at least two particular scholarly exchanges of blows. First, the 
origins of the debate can doubtlessly be traced back to a 2002 article by Marc 
Hauser, Noam Chomsky, and Tecumseh Fitch (henceforth HCF) and the ensuing 
discussions with Steven Pinker and Ray Jackendoff (see Fitch/Hauser/Chomsy, 
2005; Jackendoff/Pinker, 2005; Pinker/Jackendoff, 2005). HCF‘s essential claim 
is that the capacity for recursive syntactic procedures and how these map to 
peripheral systems are the only and decisive components that distinguish human 
language from non-human communication systems. Moreover, the authors 
hypothesize that recursion—which they unfortunately define implicitly at best—
may well be the only feature of what they conceive of as the faculty of language 
in the narrow sense (FLN), i.e. the exclusive and single ingredient that is unique 
to human language and evolved therefor.
4
 
Second, the debate has gained momentum via claims brought forward by 
Daniel Everett regarding the alleged lack of recursive structures in the syntax of 
the Amazonian Pirahã language—due to cultural restrictions—as well as by the 
critiques to this view (Everett, 2005; 2007; Nevins/Pesetsky/Rodrigues, 2007). 
Everett explicitly challenges the HCF hypothesis and assesses that by his 
findings in Pirahã grammar, in particular the absence of recursion, ―the case for 
an autonomous, biologically determined module of language is seriously 
weakened‖ (Everett, 2005: 634). The better part of the criticism drawn by these 
                                           
3
  The recency of which can easily be read off from the years of publication of the better part 
of the references to this article. 
4
  By and large, Pinker and Jackendoff reject the hypothesis on the basis of their version of a 
language-specific UG, which they understand to be far more inclusive than HCF, as well as 
because they understand recursion to be a more general principle, which cannot be 
attributed primarily or even solely to human language (Jackendoff/Pinker, 2005; 
Pinker/Jackendoff, 2005). 
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statements concerns itself with disputing the accuracy of the author‘s data and—
implicitly—his honesty.5 
The article at hand will not introduce the two debates as such in detail; yet, 
their respective subject matters serve as the vantage point for its argument. The 
putative incompatibility of the HCF hypothesis with a recursion-less language is 
in fact ill-conceived precisely because a difference exists in these very subject 
matters, i.e. recursion is approached from fundamentally opposed perspectives. 
In this regard, Tomalin identifies a degree of confusion in the debate, stating 
―different linguists interpret the word recursion in different ways—an alarming 
state of affairs‖ (Tomalin, 2007: 1796). Following Heine/Kuteva (2007: 265), at 
least two versions need to be distinguished: 
 
(1) a descriptive account of syntactic structure that uses phrase structure and 
rewrite rules as its categories 
(2) a computational definition that regards the processing mechanism as such 
as recursive 
 
These two definitions are not mutually exclusive, as the former even relies 
on a form of the latter as its structure assigning process. Yet, it will be argued 
that the MP that underlies the reasoning in HCF takes recursion to manifest 
itself along the lines of (2) in the structure building procedure called Merge. As 
will be seen, however, Merge is not necessarily recursive. Furthermore, it does 
                                           
5
  In fact, this particular debate appears somewhat pointless, as all authors can refer to 
Everett‘s own sources only (he is quite unanimously considered the single scholarly 
authority on Pirahã). His earlier work (Everett, 1986), however, differs significantly from 
the more recent one, e.g. insofar as it identifies recursive elements in the Pirahã syntax. 
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not necessarily yield the recursive structures in definition (1), which most 
authors take as a basis when describing instances of recursion in language.
6
 
The article will proceed as follows. After an introduction to recursion in 
general as well as the commonplace understanding of recursive structures within 
generative grammar, different stages in the generativist development will be 
reviewed by dint of relative clause constructions. In doing so, it will be shown 
that a noticeable reconceptualization of recursion in language has watered down 
certain basic notions of the initial concept and, more importantly, shifted the 
focus from the descriptive analysis of phrasal and sentential structure to the 
underlying, fundamental syntactic structure-building processes. These, in turn, 
no longer necessarily correlate with recursive structures readily identifiable on 
the syntactic surface. To that effect, Van der Hulst introduces the notions of 
general and specific recursion respectively (van der Hulst, 2010: xviii-xxiv).  
2 What is recursion? 
2.1 Recursion as a general principle 
Examples of recursion or recursive structures can virtually be found everywhere. 
Versions of it occur as natural phenomena, in (visual) art, storytelling, music, 
etc. All of these instances have a core feature in common: they include some 
kind of self-embedding or can be described accordingly. Douglas R. Hofstadter, 
referring to the same principle, puts it slightly differently in his famous Gödel, 
Escher, Bach: an Eternal Golden Braid, stating that recursion always involves 
 
                                           
6
  A typical and telling example of how these two notions are erroneously being lumped 
together can e.g. be found in Roeper (2007: ch.6), where the author explicitly seconds the 
HCF hypothesis (ibid.: 105-106), while he subsequently continues with an enumeration of 
self-embedding structures, which non-ambiguously relate to the structural version outlined 
in (1) above (see section 2.2 for an elaboration on structural recursion). 
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nesting, and variations of nesting. The concept is very general. 
(Stories inside stories, movies inside movies, paintings inside 
paintings, Russian dolls inside Russian dolls (even parenthetical 
comments inside parenthetical comments!) – these are just a few of 
the charms of recursion.) […] One of the most common ways in 
which recursion appears in daily life is when you postpone completing 
a task in favor of a simpler task, often of the same type. (Hofstadter, 
1979: 127) 
 
 Examples from visual art, literature, or natural phenomena
7
 can usually 
not be captured in strict mathematical terms and are therefore oftentimes 
understood as occurrences of self-similarity. In each of these cases structures are 
made up from ―smaller versions‖ of themselves, i.e., they rely on what I will call 
the sameness condition here. Thus, recursivity is attested only if we find 
structures that in a sense comprise themselves in the form of smaller, yet 
connatural instances. As Hazewinkel points out, mathematical forms of 
recursion differ in this respect, because these ―have precise mathematical 
definitions, as opposed to the vague ‗near mathematical‘ ideas about ‗recursion 
in general‘‖ (Hazewinkel, 1992: 16). In this sense, mathematicians do not 
conceive of recursion primarily from a structural, but rather from a 
computational or process-related perspective. This very difference also relates to 
the definitions (1) and (2) in the introduction and will be of crucial importance 
to the argument in the following sections. 
 General recursive definitions in mathematics (nearly) always feature at 
least two parts: a base case, which directly specifies the value for the bottom or 
smallest argument and a recursive or inductive case, which applies values of 
smaller arguments to define the result of a given argument. Applied to the 
                                           
7
  Famous examples include the following: in visual art various works of Maurits Cornelis 
Escher (e.g. Prentententoonstelling [1956]) or Russian matryoshka dolls, in literature 
Giovanni Boccaccio‘s Il Decamerone (ca. 1349-1352), and as phenomena in nature ferns 
or Romanesco broccoli. 
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primitive recursive definition of the set of natural numbers N, the following two 
clauses a. and b. provide the basis, while c. ensures that computations in fact 
result in members of N only (ibid.: 16): 
 
(3) a. Base case:  0 ϵ  N 
b. Inductive clause: For any element x in N, x + 1 is in N 




Hence, by means of adding 1 to, e.g., 4, we are able to generate 5 as the 
succeeding member of set N. The number 4 is known to be a member of N, 
because we know that 3 is, which is known because we know that 2 is, etc. This 
backward spiral will finally terminate when the base case 0 is reached—it 
therefore fulfills the condition of well-foundedness. Without a base case the 
spiral could not terminate, which means that the numbers preceding 4 could not 
be established (as it would lead to an infinite regress). However, to account for 




As can be illustrated by means of comparing the descriptive notion of 
self-similar structures with precise mathematical formulae, we crucially need to 
distinguish between the two perspectives upon recursion. The former kind 
largely applies to the self-embedding of concepts, themes, or structural 
appearances, while the latter one develops functions which account for how a 
certain structure (or number in the case above) is being generated. It will be 
argued in the following sections that this difference is reflected in—or in fact 
even in the center of—the debate on the role of recursion in human language. 
                                           
8
  Note that it is down to definition whether 0 is considered to be part of the natural numbers. 
Its in- or exclusion does not, however, affect the presented reasoning.  
9
  The Peano axioms stating that every number in the set has a successor and that two 
numbers may not share a successor. It is because of these additional (and necessary) 
presuppositions that the infinitude of language is questionable if understood in analogy to 
the set of the natural numbers (Pullum/Scholz, 2010: 119). 
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2.2 Recursive structures in linguistics 
Few authors have provided even rudimentary itemizations of the actual 
occurrences of recursion in human language (for exceptions see Karlsson, 2010; 
Roeper, 2007). Recursive structures are commonly identified to feature in 
certain morphological word-formation processes
10
 and—less undisputedly—in 
phonological sequences.
11
 Due to the article‘s limited scope, however, I will 
focus on syntactic structures, as syntax is not only the core domain of 
generativism but also the framework‘s point of origin for linguistic creativity. 
More precisely, yet, the upcoming section will briefly introduce what Van der 
Hulst calls specific recursion, i.e., ―what most linguists usually have in mind 
when they define recursion as embedding a constituent in a constituent of the 
same type‖ (van der Hulst, 2010: xix).12 
 In classic, formal description recursive syntax relies on constituency and 
phrase structure as the categories which embed in one another and upon which 
the sameness condition is based (see section 2.1; Parker, 2006). In all of these 
cases, a certain symbol A is replaceable by a string of symbols which contains 
another instance of A, such as [A  B (D) A] or the usual way of capturing it by 
means of two rules as in (4), where the recursive component is triggered by rule 
(4b.) (Bar-Hillel, 1953; Tomalin, 2007). 
 
                                           
10
  In particular multiple compounding as in newspaper journalist ([[[news]N [paper]N] 
[journalist]N]N). Some authors also include prefix sequences into their registers of 
examples of recursive instances (see e.g. Roeper, 2007).  
11
  See Pinker/Jackendoff (2005), Schreuder (2006), and Van der Hulst (2010) for opposing 
views on this question. 
12
  In fact, the dicussion here will be further restricted to tail-recursive structures, i.e., 
structures which embed instances of the same kind to either the left or the right side of 
themselves. As such, tail-recursion needs to be distinguished from center-embeddings such 
as The mouse the cat the dog fought chased ran away. For discussion (and especially for 
performance-related restrictions) see Bach/Brown/Marslen-Wislon (1986); 
Christiansen/Chater (1999); Karlsson (2007). 
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(4) a. A  B C 
 b. C  D A 
 
 Translated to a natural language example, we can formalize the build-up 
of sentence (5)—and its recursive step—by means of statements on its 
individual constituents in (6). 
 
(5) Peter believes that Kate knows the answer. 
 
(6) a. S  NP VP 
 b. VP  V S 
 c. VP  V NP 
d. NP  N 
 
 The sentence in (5) can then be said to contain another sentence—in the 
form of a Complementizer Phrase, i.e., a subordinate clause, that typically 
follows verbs of speech or thought (here believes)—as its granddaughter. The 
recursive step is statement (6b.), which holds that a verb phrase (VP) can embed 
another sentence (S). Crucially, the interplay between rules (6a.&b.) is a 
potentially endless one and as such meets a further characteristic of productive 
recursion identified by most linguists, namely that in principle recursive rules 
need to be applicable infinitely.
13
 Structures derived in this fashion are 
                                           
13
  The question in how far ―true‖—i.e., productive—recursion is down to potentially endless 
rule application is a tricky one, as capping embedding to so-called level-one depth features 
in different constructions in many languages and is oftentimes understood as non-recursive 
or as an exception to the rule. Consider e.g. the apparent impossibility in English to stack 
non-restrictive relative clauses that modify the same NP, constructions that are perfectly 
fine in e.g. Japanese (Newmeyer, 2008: 62): 
 *John, who goes to MIT, who likes math, will get a job. 
 or the ungrammaticality of multiple prenominal possessive constructions in German 
(Nevins/Pesetsky/Rodrigues, 2007: 11-13; Roeper, 2007: 112-113): 
 English: John’s car’s motor vs. German: *Johannes’ Autos Motor 
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hierarchical and differ from iterative sequences (e.g. a very, very, very tall man) 
insofar as ―recursion builds structure by increasing embedding depth whereas 
iteration yields flat output structures, repetitive sequences on the same depth 
level as the first instance‖ (Karlsson, 2010: 43). 
  Typical examples of tail-recursion (cf. footnote 12) include the 
following: propositional complements after verbs of speech and thought as in 
(7a.), prepositional phrases ((7b.)), relative clauses ((7c.)), prenominal 
possessives ((7d.)). 
 
(7) a. Peter believes that Kate claims that John knows the answer. 
 b. There is a bird in the tree in the garden behind the house. 
 c. The man, who lives in a house, which is next to a street, is tall. 
 d. John’s mother’s friend’s bike is broken. 
 
 As can be gathered from the examples in (7) above, recursive structural 
depth is not singularly a syntactic phenomenon but can also be approached from 
a semantic perspective. In this sense, we e.g. cannot exchange, substitute, or 
leave out any of the prenominal possessives in (7d.) without (at least possibly) 
changing the overall meaning of the sentence, which—by means of recursion—
―allows us to specify reference to an object to an arbitrary fine level of 
precision‖ (Parker, 2006: 241). A different, yet related claim on semantic 
grounds holds for (7a.), where we have to state that only the matrix sentence 
(Peter believes that…) has a truth value, while its sentential complements do 
                                                                                                                                    
 For discussion and opposing views on the distinction between and nature of simple and 
productive recursion see e.g. Evans/Levinson (2009), Heine/Kuteva (2007), Roeper (2007). 
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not.
14
 In other words, truth value does not embed in truth value, while reference 
does not embed in reference, either (Arsenijević/Hinzen, 2010).15 Accordingly, 
Hurford (2004) points out that ―the conceptual structures expressed by the 
sentences of languages are themselves best characterized by recursive 
descriptions‖ (ibid.: 563). Despite the Chomskyan mantra of syntactic autonomy 
(see e.g. Chomsky, 1957: 17), the semantic motivation for recursive structures 
on the basis of (recursive) conceptual structures appears to be based on a 
 
fairly basic cognitive activity, namely taxonomy. […] Once there is a 
linguistic expression for relations such as between less inclusive and 
more inclusive, part and whole, one social role and another, or 
possessee and possessor, the way is cleared for recursion to enter. 
(Heine/Kuteva, 2007: 269) 
 
 As an intermediate conclusion, we can analyze recursive structures as 
instances of specific recursion along the lines of definition (1) above. Here, 
recursive structures rely on hierachical phrase structure and constituents (which 
tend to be described in top-down fashion), while embedding on different depth 
levels distinguishes them from mere iteration. Moreover, such structures appear 
to have clear-cut semantic and conceptual bases, which allow themselves to also 
be interpreted in recursive terms. 
                                           
14
  Note that this claim does not necessarily hold true for factive verbs such as know in the 
matrix or embedding sentences, which arguably imply the truth of X in sentences such as 
Peter knows X. 
15
  Arsenijević/Hinzen (2010) argue recursion to not immediately feature in syntax at all. 
They claim it to be an epiphenomenon, which comes into being after spell-out of 
individual derivational cycles; therefore, overt recursive structures are always subdivided 
by intermediate elements (such as the complementizer that in (7a.) or the genitive ‗s in 
between the NPs in (7d.)). 
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3 A brief historical excursus 
The aforementioned confusion in the recent debate on the status of recursion in 
linguistics directly relates to the notion of the term just outlined in 2.2. It was 
this conceptualization that delivered the sole interpretative basis in the earlier 
frameworks of generative grammar up until the MP. Therefore, I will provide a 
very brief historical sketch of the development, via which the notional shift of a 
descriptive account of specific recursion (definition (1) and section 2.2) to the 
computational perspective of general recursion (definition (2)) can be retraced. 
The developmental stages under scrutiny will follow a similar endeavor by 
Bickerton (2008) and roughly relate to the frameworks based on Chomsky 
(1956; 1957), Chomsky (1965), and Chomsky (1995). 
3.1 Transformational grammar 
The framework known as Transformational Grammar was initiated by 
Chomsky‘s early work (1956; 1957) and divided into two components. First, it 
featured phrase structure, by means of which simple sentences—i.e., kernel 
sentences (in Chomskyan terminology) that undergo only obligatory 
transformations due to contextual restrictions
16—were built. Second, a 
transformational component ensured the derivation of complex sentences out of 
simple ones. Crucially, in case of hypotactic subordination, embedding did not 
feature in the phrase structure component but relied on prefabricating kernel 
sentences and adjoining them in a second step. 
 With regard to relative clauses such as (7c.), the idea at the time was that 
by dint of a certain transformational or embedding rule—the relative clause 
transformation—a full-fledged sentence could be adjoined to a noun phrase as 
                                           
16
  E.g., the occurrence of certain auxiliaries and past tense marking at verbs in certain 
contexts; see Chomsky (1957: 38-40).    
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its modifier. Disregarding certain restrictions here,
17
 the single prerequisite for 
embedding one kernel sentences to another was that the two share a noun 
phrase. The relative transformation was non-directional and ―either [could] be 
embedded to the other as a relative clause‖ (Smith, 1964: 40). Therefore, the two 
simple sentences in (8a. & b.) could generate both (8c. & d.) via the same 
mechanism—including reordering of constituents and subsequent deletion of the 




(8) a. The man is Harry’s brother. 
 b. You saw the man yesterday. 
 c. The man you saw yesterday is Harry’s brother. 
 d. You saw the man, who is Harry’s brother, yesterday. 
 
 The recursive structures in (8c. & d.) lend themselves to the analysis of 
specific recursion in (1) as well as 2.2. This holds true for their phrase structural 
basis as well as their conceptual motivation. Importantly, again, we are dealing 
here with an insertion procedure of already established simple sentences. Thus, 
from a derivational perspective, ―the Syntactic Structures model [i.e., Chomsky 
(1957); S.K./H.H.] involved recursion only in the transformational component, 
when one prefabricated S was inserted in another prefabricated S‖ (Bickerton, 
2008: n.p.; first emphasis in the original, second and third added). 
                                           
17
  Such as the impossibility of adjoining an appositive relative clause to noun phrases with 
certain determiners, as in *Any book, which is about linguistics, is interesting (but The 
book, which is about linguistics, is interesting); see Smith (1964: 38). 
18
 The examples in (8) have been adopted from Bickerton (2008) and extended to fit the 
argument. For a formal sketch of the relative clause transformation see Smith (1964: 40-
41). 
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3.2 Generalized phrase markers 
The concept of generalized phrase markers in Chomsky‘s Aspects of the Theory 
of Syntax (1965) marked a fundamental change to transformational grammar as 
outlined in 3.1. By the introduction of deep structure and a phrase structural 
base component the new version of generative grammar did away with the 
necessity of general transformations to account for the insertion of (simple) 
sentences within (simple) sentences. Chomsky (1965) comments on this 
evolution as follows: 
 
In the earlier version of the theory, the recursive property was 
assigned to the transformational component, in particular, to the 
generalized transformations and the rules for forming Transformation-
markers. Now the recursive property is a feature of the base 
component, in particular, of the rules that introduce the initial symbol 
S in designated positions in strings of category symbols. There are, 
apparently, no other recursive rules in the base. (ibid.: 137) 
 
Thus, relative clauses, to stay with our example domain, no longer relied on 
the prefabrication of kernel sentences and a posteriori adjoining of one of them 
as a modifier to a NP in the embedding one. In contrast, the complex example 
sentence (8c.) above (The man you saw yesterday is Harry’s brother.) only had 
one underlying (yet expanded) phrase structural representation as its deep 
structure, illustrated in (9d.); constituents in brackets in (9b. & c.), then, stood 
for optional realizations (Bickerton, 2008; Chomsky, 1965). 
 
(9) a. S  NP VP 
 b. NP  (Det) N (NP) (PP) (S) 
 c. VP  V (NP) (PP) (S) 
 d. S  NP[Det N S[NP VP]] VP[V  NP[N   NP[N]]] 
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 The transformational component, in turn, was ―solely interpretive‖ 
(Chomsky, 1965: 137) and matched surface structure M‘ (i.e., e.g. an actual 
sentence) to deep structure M (the generalized phrase marker)—―only if M‘ is 
well formed, then M was a deep structure‖ (ibid.: 140). Be that as it may, 
recursion as understood in Chomsky‘s (1965) Aspects theory still subscribed to 
the foundational ideas of hierarchical phrase structure. As shown in (9d.), we 
can even identify a total of three recursive instances: one S embedded within 
another S and NPs within NPs in two cases (Bickerton, 2008). 
3.3 Minimalist Merge 
The decades following Aspects saw a further reduction of the transformational 
component
19
 in the Government and Binding theory and the Principles and 
Parameters approach, which eventually gave way to the introduction of the 
Minimalist program (MP) (Chomsky, 1995). The MP hypothesizes that only two 
processes are responsible for syntactic structure building, Move and Merge.
20
 
Importantly, this framework directly connects the infinitude of language—and 
hence linguistic creativity—to Merge, whereas recursive structures such as the 
ones identified by the early Chomsky (1956; 1957; 1965) are merely a non-
obligatory possibility which can be achieved by the mechanism (van der Hulst, 
2010: xviii-xxiv). Accordingly, Chomsky (2007) states that it is the unbounded 
application of Merge which ―yields a discrete infinity of structured expressions‖ 
(ibid.: 5). In this vein, Merge builds structure in bottom-up fashion by 
combining individual elements to labeled ones, which in turn can be made 
subject to the same process again (Radford, 2004: 57-68). 
                                           
19
  E.g. the twofold arrangement of a deep-structure underlying a surface-structure began to be 
abandoned, while movement operations were concentrated in a single principle Move 
alpha. 
20
  In fact, Move is oftentimes taken to be a special case of Merge, namely internal Merge.  
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 However, if we maintain that phrase structure is the domain in which 
recursive loops are to be found, Merge per se is not in accordance with the 
sameness condition as introduced in 2.1 above as a necessary prerequisite for 
recursive structures. Yet, the MP reasoning appears to abandon phrase structure 
as this domain and HCF explicitly establish the recursivity of Merge 
analogously to the generation of the natural numbers (HCF: 1571). We are then 
confronted with a process-related case of general recursion in the sense of Van 
der Hulst (2010: xix) (see 2.1). Therefore, a reformulation of the category upon 
which sameness is based is required and introduced by the notion of syntactic 
objects. Chomsky (1995) straightforwardly defines syntactic objects and how 
they are combined locally and recursively, stating that ―the simplest such 
operation takes a pair of syntactic objects (SOi, SOj) and replaces them by a new 
combined syntactic object SOij. Call this operation Merge‖ (ibid.: 226; emphasis 
in the original). He continues with a formalization of this definition: 
 
a. lexical items 
b. K = {γ, {α, β}}, where α, β are objects and γ is the label of K 
Objects of type [a.] are complexes of features, listed in the lexicon. 
The recursive step is [b.]. (ibid.: 243) 
 
 The analogy to the natural numbers (see (3) in 2.1), then, is fairly 
unambiguous. Chomsky defines a base case (a.) as well as an inductive clause 
(what he calls the recursive step in b.). The category syntactic object is—parallel 




                                           
21
  Technically speaking, as Tomalin (2007) points out, the successor function used in 
deriving the sequence of the natural numbers can—just like Merge—be captured in terms 
of inductive definitions and does not require ‗full-fledged mathematical recursion‘ (ibid.: 
1797-1799); but see section 2.1. 
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The crucial point for the discussion at hand, however, is that by means of 
the introduction of Merge recursive structure building has been decoupled from 
recursive structures. Multiple application of Merge does in fact account for the 
derivation of recursive structures—as conceived of traditionally and found e.g. 
in relative clauses such as in (8c.) above—in the long run.22 Yet, the structure 
building process of any linguistic structure that runs through the Merge 
operation more than once (i.e., even fragments of sentences, clauses or phrases 
can do) has by definition already been a recursive. The fragmentary nature of 
‗recursive‘ Merge as well as its principle potential to create recursive structures 
can be illustrated with the help of the VP in (10a.) and its bottom-up derivation 




(10) a. trying to help you 
 b.  VP 
  
    V  PRN 




   T  VP 
   to   
   
V  PRN 
help  you  
 
 
                                           
22
  See Van der Hulst (2010: xviii-xxiv) for a discussion of how general recursion allows for 
specific recursion as a possible by-product.  
23
  T and TP stand for a tense-marking constituent and a tense phrase or tense projection, 
respectively. 





  V          TP 
         trying 
 
 T  VP 
 to 
 
  V  PRN 
          help  you 
 
 
 The difference between the two structure fragments (10c.) and (10d.) 
sheds further light on the terminological confusion. While the derivations as 
well as the example sentence in (10) are taken from Radford‘s (2004) textbook 
on Minimalist syntax, in which the author states multiple applications of Merge, 
he does not identify the property of recursion until stage (10d.) is reached, in 
which we indeed find a recursive structure (a VP containing a VP) (ibid.: 61). 
However, substituting the phrase labels of all non-terminal nodes with the 
technical category syntactic object will lead to a structural representation of 
(10c.) that does display an instance of recursion, as well. Yet again, the 
expression to help you neither exhibits recursion on a conceptual or semantic 
level nor in its traditional phrase structural representation, but relies on the 
arguably arbitrary introduction of a derivational ‗super category‘.24 For these 
reasons, the putative recursivity of Merge is oftentimes dismissed as merely ―an 
iterative procedure, consisting of repeated applications of an identical process‖ 
                                           
24
  The distinction can in particular be read off from different structural representations. While 
the conventional X‘ schemata—usually applied in the Government and Binding 
framework—make use of varying, phrase-dependent category labels, bare phrase structure 
uses unlabeled tree diagrams, in which sets of features are implicit in the lexical entries of 
the constituents in terminal node positions; see Radford (2004: 78-80).  
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(Bickerton, 2008: n.p.; bold type in the original). Everett‘s (2008) stance on 
Merge is even more pejorative: 
 
The newest definition of recursion to emerge from Chomsky‘s school 
makes recursion a form of compositionality. Simply put, it says that 
you can put parts together to make something new and you can do that 
endlessly. Under this novel notion of recursion, which is not accepted 
by any mathematical linguists or computer scientists that I know of, if 
I can put words together to form a sentence, that is recursion. (ibid.: 
229) 
4 Conclusion 
The recent debate on recursion has been characterized by conceptual and 
terminological confusion. The better part of the linguists commenting on the 
hypotheses brought forth by HCF have argued on grounds of what has been 
called specific recursion here, i.e. instances of phrase structural representations 
in which a member of a certain category is embedded within a member of the 
same category. This notion also used to be the unanimously accepted version 
among generative grammarians up until the Minimalist assumption of Merge as 
the sole structure building procedure. 
 As has been shown, the differences between recursive structures relying 
on hierarchical phrase structure, on the one hand, and ‗recursive‘ Merge, which 
builds any syntactic structure from bottom-up, on the other, can be traced back 
to two related, yet distinct concepts. First, self-similar structures are 
characterized by the self-embedding of themes or concepts and found virtually 
ubiquitously, e.g. in nature, visual art, or music. Recursive structures in human 
language seem to relate to these on grounds of their semantic and conceptual 
motivation. Second, a computational perspective defines structure-building 
processes as such as recursive and can be captured with mathematical formulae. 
Merge can, apparently, be interpreted to fulfill this condition and be defined in 
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direct analogy to the generation of the natural numbers. Following the 
Minimalist program, it eventually generates all syntactic expressions, among 
them also recursive structures as traditionally conceived of. 
 Thus, challenging HCF on grounds of the alleged non-existence of 
recursive structures in a given language—as e.g. Everett (2005) does due to his 
findings in Pirahã grammar—appears ill-conceived, as recursivity in 
Minimalism does not presuppose the existence of structures of the kind. 
Nevertheless, several linguists regard multiple Merge to be an iterative, rather 
than a recursive process and therefore question the accuracy of the conflation of 
Merge, recursion, and linguistic infinitude. Even if ‗recursive‘ Merge is 
considered technically sound in its build-up, however, the necessary 
introduction of a category independent from phrase structure, i.e. syntactic 
object, poses a more global problem: If any hierarchical combination of more 
than two items (of whatever kind, language-related or not) is recursive as long as 
an appropriate category is chosen that happens to comprise all subparts within 
the structure, is hierarchy then basically tantamount to recursion?  
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